The Partial Factor Test in Title VII Discrimination, King v. Laborer’s International Union of North America, Union Local 818, 443 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1971) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1972 Issue 2 
January 1972 
The Partial Factor Test in Title VII Discrimination, King v. Laborer’s 
International Union of North America, Union Local 818, 443 F.2d 
273 (6th Cir. 1971) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The Partial Factor Test in Title VII Discrimination, King v. Laborer’s International Union of North America, 
Union Local 818, 443 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1971), 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 368 (1972). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/11 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
TAE PARTIAL FACTOR TEST IN TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION
King v. Laborer's International Union of North America,
Union Local 818, 443 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1971)
Plaintiff King brought a civil action, under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 alleging discrimination by Local 818 of the La-
borers International Union of North America. King claimed that the
Union had refused, because of his race, to give him an equal oppor-
tunity to picket, and that this was a violation of the Union's obligation
under the Act not "to exclude or to expel from its membership, or
otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race,
color . *"2 The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff
could recover if the jury found that the Union's refusal to alow King
to picket was "solely on account of his race. . ."' (emphasis added).
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant Union. Plaintiff ap-
pealed on the ground that the jury was erroneously instructed. 4 - The
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VIII. Plaintiff proceeded
under § 2000e-5.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970). Plaintiff first filed his charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pursuant to § 2000e-5(a). The
EEOC found "reasonable cause" to believe that the defendant union had violated its
statutory duty. Plaintiff's private civil action was brought after the EEOC failed to
obtain voluntary compliance through conciliation. King v. Laborers Int'l Local 818,
443 F.2d 273, 275 (6th Cir. 1971).
3. In the trial court's instructions, it was noted that the "defendant admits that
the plaintiff has not been used as a picket in some instances but that this action has
been based upon the plaintiff's condition, attitude or actions while used as a picket and
that he has never been denied such picket rights because of his race." 443 F.2d at
275.
4. The trial judge also charged the jury that for the plaintiff to prevail the union
must have intentionally followed a practice or pattern of discrimination against him
by reason of his race and that an isolated instance of discrimination was not suffi-
cient. Id. at 275. The plaintiff contended that these two instructions were also defec-
tive since, in a private suit, an isolated instance of discrimination is sufficient to es-
tablish a violation of Title VII. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
"private aggrieved party" is a vindicator of the public right and that his complaint
under Title VII may be based on a single act of alleged discrimination. Id. at 278.
See also St. Clair Teamsters v. Local 515, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969); Everett v.
Trans World Airlines, 298 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (W.D. Mo. 1970). The court found
that even if an intentional pattern and practice to discriminate were required, the
District Court erred in failing to explain that the intent may be inferred from the
totality of the Union's conduct and the surrounding circumstances. 443 F.2d at 278.
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Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the jury should
have been charged that if race was, in part, a causal factor in the
Union's determination not to use King on the picket lines, he was en-
titled to recover.' The court did not cite any cases in support of this
proposition, but indicated simply that the language of the act com-
pelled this result.6
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(l) is aimed specifically at union discrimi-
nation against union members. This provision makes it unlawful for
a union "to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Other sections of Title VII use substantially
identical language to prohibit discrimination by employers7 and em-
ployment agencies." In suits brought under Title VII, a plaintiff is
clearly entitled to relief if he can prove that his employer dismissed
him or that his union excluded him solely on account of his race.9
Frequently, however, the evidence shows that the defendant acted for
more than one reason, only one of which involved discrimination. In
this situation, it is less clear that the conduct is prohibited.
The language of the act is silent on the extent to which discrimina-
tion must be present to make a defendant's conduct unlawful, and no
Title VII case prior to King has confronted this problem. However,
the legislative history of the act gives a clear indication of congressional
intent on this point. In 1964, the Senate' ° and the House of Repre-
5. King v. Local 818, Laborers Int'l, 443 F.2d 273, 278 (6th Cir. 1971). In
finding that the trial court's instructions unduly limited the plaintiff's right to recover,
the court held that when two reasons may be established for the Union's conduct, one
lawful and the other discriminatory, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover unless
the union shows that the lawful reason was the sole factor in its conduct. Id. at
278-79.
6. Id. at 279.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970):
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970):
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment
agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin...
9. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Marquez v. Omaha Dist.
Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
10. 110 CoNG. REc. 13,838 (1964).
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sentatives" defeated a proposed amendment which would have added
the word solely to sub-sections a, b, and c of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2. Sen-
ate debate prior to rejection of the amendment reflects a determination
that such an amendment would defeat the purpose of the Act by placing
an excessive burden on the plaintiff to prove discrimination.12 The
failure of the proposed amendment to pass either chamber indicates that
the Congress viewed Title VII as prohibiting conduct based, in whole
or in part, on the consideration of discriminatory factors.
Discrimination problems analagous to the one faced by the court in
King have been considered by courts interpreting the National Labor
Relations Act"3 (NLRA), and many of the cases have reached the
same result as the court in King, i.e. that unlawful discrimination may
be proved even if it is only a part of the reason for the defendant's
action. While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against discrimi-
nation because of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin",' 4 the
NLRA prohibits discrimination against employees for organizing or
bargaining collectively.'" In the absence of Title VII cases in point,
cases arising under the NLRA serve as useful precedent in analyzing
the type of discrimination problem in King. The two statutes share
similarities in statutory language'0 and a similar interest in the elimi-
11. 110 CONG. REc. 2728 (1964).
12. In debate over the amendment introduced by Senator McClellan, Senator Case
remarked: "[tihe difficulty with this amendment is that it would render Title VII
totally nugatory. If anyone ever had an action motivated by a single cause, he is a
different animal than any I know of. But beyond that difficulty, this amendment
would place upon persons attempting to prove a violation of this section, no matter
how clear the violation was, an obstacle so great as to make the title completely
worthless." 110 CoNG. RFc. 13,837 (1964). Senator Magnuson also opposed the
McClellan amendment on the ground that ensuing court interpretation would be an
impediment to the Act: "The difficulty is that a court interpretation of the word
'solely' would so limit this section as probably to negate the entire proposal of what
we are trying to do." 110 CONG. Rc. 13,837 (1964).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1965).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1965).
16. Both the NLRA and Title VII make discrimination in the labor context
unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970). An analogy
between the tests for discrimination arising out of NLRA cases and a possible test
under Title VII has two limitations: (1) there is no language in the NLRA which ex-
actly parallels the Title VII prohibition of discrimination by a union against its mem-
bers; the NLRA prohibition against discrimination is aimed at employers, and only
indirectly at unions. But see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1965) which prohibits a union
from causing an employer to discriminate illegally against non-union employees;
(2) the motive behind the discrimination made unlawful by the NLRA is the em-
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nation of obstructions to commerce;' 7 furthermore, the subject matter
common to both acts is discrimination in the employment context.' s
In NLRA cases, courts have taken three approaches when the evi-
dence indicates that the employer acted for more than one reason,
at least one of which was discriminatory. The first allows a finding
for the complainant only if the sole reason for the conduct is illegal.19
Under the second test, the complainant can recover if the illegal reason
is the dominant or motivating factor in the decision.2" The third test,
the partial factor test, is substantially identical to the one used in King.
It allows the complainant to recover if unlawful discrimination is even
a partial factor in the challenged conduct. -
ployee's union association rather than his race, religion, or national origin. In this
respect, the NLRA and Title VII are not directed at the same type of discrimination.
Nonetheless, courts in NLRA cases have developed approaches to the problem of
discrimination in the labor context. Since courts in Title VII cases must do so as
well, an analysis of the former is relevant to consideration of the latter.
17. While the NLRA is aimed at employment discrimination inhibiting work-
er's freedom to organize and bargain collectively, it was enacted to eliminate the
causes of obstructions of the free flow of commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1965). The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII is a part, was also enacted under the
commerce clause. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
18. Both acts sought to eliminate discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment. "The Act [Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] . . . and the regu-
lations of the EEOC are based on large part on the National Labor Relations Act and
the regulations of the NLRB." I.B.E.W. Local 5 v. United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, 398 F.2d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1968).
19. NLRB v. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 1965): "... we can-
not find there is any substantial evidence in this record considered as a whole to
support the conclusion that Woodriff was discharged solely because of his adherence to
the union despite his objectionable behavior." (emphasis in original); Shattock Dern
Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966); Fort Smith Broadcasting
Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1965).
20. This test seemingly allows for a balancing of the two reasons asserted and
provides that the unlawful reason must be the stronger of the two, but not neces-
sarily the sole reason.
In order to supply a basis for inferring discrimination, it is necessary to
show that one reason for the discharge is that the employee was engaging
in protected activity. It need not be the only reason, but it is sufficient if
it is a substantial or motivating reason, despite the fact that other reasons
may exist.
Although the discharge of an inefficient or insubordinate union member or
organizer is lawful, it may become discriminatory if other circumstances rea-
sonably indicate that the union activity weighed more heavily in the deci-
sion to fire him than did dissatisfaction with his performance. NLRB v.
Whitin Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1953).
21. NLRB v. Automotive Controls Corp., 406 F.2d 221, 226 (10th Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. Arkansas Grain Corp., 392 F.2d 161, 167 (8th Cir. 1968); Betts Baking Co.
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It is helpful to consider the application of the three tests to a hypo-
thetical situation. A discharged black who had been consistently late
for work must prove -under the first test that his tardiness had no bear-
ing on the dismissal and that the employer's action was based entirely
on race or color. Under the second test, the employee must prove that
race or color was the dominant reason for his discharge and that this
tardiness was no more than a secondary consideration. Under the par-
tial factor test, the employee must prove only that race or color was
considered in his dismissal; the existence of other reasons would not
affect the finding of unlawful conduct by the employer.
NLRA cases applying the partial factor test are essentially of two
types. First, courts consider whether the employer's legally permissible
reasons were sufficient alone to justify the discharge. In one such case,
an employer discharged an employee who had been active in the union.
The employer maintained that the employee had been discharged be-
cause he was not needed and did not have a license and therefore could
not operate the company autos. The court answered per curiam:
[The evidence sufficied (sic) to "provide a reasonable basis for in-
ferring that the permissible ground alone would not have led to the
discharge, so that it was partially motivated by an unpermissible one."
NLRB v. Dazzo Products, Inc.22
In the second type, a court finds for the complainant if an unlawful
reason was considered by the employer, even if an entirely sufficient
reason for discharge exists. In this latter case, the complainant must
satisfy a difficult burden, because the employer's proof of the existence
of a wholly sufficient reason for discharge creates a strong presumption
of validity in his conduct.23
v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 205-06 (10th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Barberton Plastics Prod.,
354 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1965); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp 424,
430 (D.C. Utah, 1971). See also NLRB v. Rubber Rolls, Inc., 388 F.2d 71,
74 (3d Cir. 1967). For a treatment of the employer's defense of business reasons
or business necessity in Title VII cases see Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
798-800 (4th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the burden of proof in Title VII cases
see Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971).
22. 358 F.2d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1966). In NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats,
Inc., 341 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1965), the court stated that proof could be made by
showing that the permissible ground was insufficient for discharge or that other em-
ployees, who had committed similar acts, but were not known to be engaged in union
activity, had not been discharged. This would establish an inference that had the
discharged employees not engaged in union activities they would not have been
discharged.
23. ". . . [Ilf the discharge was motivated, even in part, by union activity, it is
[Vol. 1972:368
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The partial factor test as applied by the King court establishes an
approach for courts to use in deciding on the extent to which discrimi-
nation must be present to make a defendant's conduct unlawful. Use
of the partial factor test may be criticized on the ground that permis-
sible reasons for an employer's conduct, although compounded by dis-
criminatory ones, should be controlling in light of the legitimate busi-
ness interest in removing from employment those who do not properly
perform their jobs. On the other hand, the national interest in pre-
venting racial discrimination is better served by prohibiting employers
and unions from allowing a factor irrelevant to job performance to af-
fect the terms and conditions of employment. In a Title VII action,
the latter interest should prevail.
Although the result in King is sound, the court overlooked compel-
ling reasons available to support its holding, and relied instead on the
unexplained language of the act. A better reasoned opinion might
have pointed to congressional intent, analagous case law under the
NLRA, and strong policy considerations to support the result reached.
illegal despite the existence of adequate cause for firing her." NLRB v. Historic
Smithville Inn, 414 F.2d 1358, 1361 (3d Cir. 1969). The court found that the em-
ployee's chronic tardiness would have been an entirely legitimate reason for discharge,
but it appeared from the evidence that the court had also considered her union ac-
tivity. Cf. Wonder State Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 737, 738 (6th Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Electric
City Dying Co., 178 F.2d 980, 983 (3d Cir. 1950).
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